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High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes: The Policy and
Politics of a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial
Interrogations
Andrew E. Taslitz
Synopsis
Much has been written about the need to videotape the entire process of police
interrogating suspects. Videotaping discourages abusive interrogation techniques, improves
police training in proper techniques, reduces frivolous suppression motions because facts are no
longer in dispute, and improves jury decision making about the voluntariness and accuracy of a
confession. Despite these benefits, only a small, albeit growing, number of states have adopted
legislation mandating electronic recording of the entire interrogation process. In the hope of
accelerating legislative adoption of this procedure and of improving the quality of such
legislation, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), formerly the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, ratified a uniform recording statute for consideration by
the states. I was the Reporter for this ULC effort. This article, after briefly summarizing the need
for the uniform Act and its major provisions, focuses on its most interesting and novel
provisions: those affecting remedies if police fail to record when required.
The Act creates a suppression remedy if the failure to record renders the confession
“unreliable,” that is, involving too great a risk of its falsity for a jury to rely upon it. Although
this remedy is not unheard of, it is unusual, and this article explains and defends this remedial
choice. Suppression is, however, not automatic but is subject to a balancing process. The Act
also provides for a cautionary jury instruction. This article discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of that model, including the unlikelihood that a jury instruction alone can adequately
protect the innocent. This article argues for the importance of the availability of the suppression
remedy – an option most of the small pool of state legislation has generally rejected – and for the
importance of admitting expert testimony on the risks of error inherent in custodial interrogation,
especially when it is not recorded. A draft of the Act included such a provision, and this article
challenges the policy wisdom of the final Act’s not addressing expert testimony. The Act also
mandates police preparation of regulations that must address certain specified subjects and
provides mechanisms for police transparency and accountability in the recording process. The
Act contains a novel provision protecting police departments from civil liability in this area if
they promulgate and adequately enforce reasonable regulations designed to implement the Act
but an individual officer nevertheless strays from those mandates. This article defends that
choice.
Ultimately, this article concludes that, though the Act is not perfect from a policy
perspective, it is an excellent step forward. Moreover, it was drafted via a process involving
many stakeholders, paying particular attention to the concerns of law enforcement. The focus
here on remedies when police fail to comply with the Act may wrongly create the impression
that the Act embodies distrust of law enforcement. To the contrary, the Act is designed to
improve law enforcement’s ability to catch the guilty while acquitting the innocent, and many of
its novel provisions stem from law enforcement suggestions. Though the Act may be flawed, it
1

offers the best opportunity thus far for promoting continued and wider reform efforts in the
states.
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High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes: The Policy and
Politics of a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial
Interrogations
Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. Introduction
In the fall of 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) sent to the fifty state legislatures its
proposed Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act. That Act sets out a
framework for requiring police to record the entire process of interrogating suspects, start to
finish. 1 The prevailing practice has instead been to record only the confession itself, which may
result from many hours of interrogation, or to rely upon written or untaped oral confessions. 2
Current practice has led to false confessions, escape of the guilty for years, violations of
constitutional rights, and insufficient training in the most effective techniques – all this occurring
despite the diligent efforts of the largely well-meaning and experienced cadre of police
interrogators. 3
Although hundreds of the tens of thousands of police departments in the United States have
voluntarily adopted interrogation-recording procedures, and perhaps two handfuls of states have
mandated these procedures by statute or court decision, the vast majority of police departments
still do not record. 4 The hope of the Act’s drafters is that putting the prestige of the ULC – best

*Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1981.
1
See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ACT (2010) (UERCIA).
2
See Thomas Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005) (noting historical absence of recording the entire custodial interrogation process).
3
See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 296-305 (2008) (summarizing the benefits
of recording).
4
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1131-36 (discussing state legislation and judicial decisions); Alan M. Gershel, A
Review of the Law Requiring the Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 9-10 (2010)
(“Over 500 jurisdictions have now enacted policies and procedures requiring their officers to record confessions in
certain circumstances. At present, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have enacted such requirements
through the state legislature, court decision, amendment to the state’s rules of evidence, or by court rules.”); Thomas
Sullivan, Departments That Currently Record a Majority of Custodial Interrogations, 4/4/11 (unpublished study)
(on file with author).
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known as the author of the Uniform Commercial Code5 – behind the electronic recording process
will accelerate its widespread national adoption, improve uniformity, and improve the quality
and efficiency by which interrogation occurs.6 Whether the Act achieves these goals will not be
known for many years as it must wend its way through the cumbersome and highly political
process of moving from proposal to legislation in each state in which it is considered.
I was the Reporter for the Act, and this article stems from that experience. Here I plan to
provide only the briefest summary of the Act’s core provisions. Those provisions, mandating
recording under specified circumstances, are unquestionably the main motivation behind the
Act.7 But they are neither unusual nor add much to the scholarly and political debate – with one
exception: the sheer flexibility they give individual jurisdictions to determine the scope of the
mandate, combined with the numerous exceptions to the mandate, should aid in overcoming
political roadblocks to the legislation.8
My focus instead will be on the Act’s remedial provisions – and related rule making sections
– which do advance the debate in important ways.9 Specifically, the remedies include an
admittedly weak suppression option but one that includes suppression not only because a
confession is involuntary but also because it is unreliable.10 Unreliability is not a federal
constitutional ground for suppression of confessions and is rarely a statutory ground for doing

5

The ULC’s website summarizes its mission and accomplishments. See www.nccusl.org (last visited June 30,
2011). The ULC was previously known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
id.
6
These were certainly the uppermost goals discussed in the drafting meetings that I attended. See also Commentary,
Section 2, UERCIA (discussing goals of the uniform legislation).
7
See UERCIA §.3.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 66-104.
9
See UERCIA .§§13, 15-16.
10
See id. §13(a); infra text accompanying notes 89-102. The “unreliability” provision is bracketed, however,
meaning that jurisdictions must consider whether to include it if they adopt the UAERCIA. See UERCIA§13(a).
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so.11 Moreover, the prohibition against unreliable evidence may provide a toe-hold for future
development of a more general principle of the reliability of any evidence that might otherwise
raise an unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction. 12
The remedies also include a cautionary jury instruction where law enforcement has failed,
without a statutory excuse, to comply with recording mandates.13 Law enforcement embraced
this remedy as the most important one available, eliminating the need for muscular alternatives. I
agree that the remedy may have value but disagree that that value is so great as to render other
stronger remedies pointless, particularly given a dearth of completed relevant experimental
research.14 I partially lost this debate, however, in the drafting committee, and I lay out my case
here. That I lost is not necessarily a bad thing – my favored alternatives may have been
politically unpalatable. But there is value in understanding the rejected options versus the
accepted ones, and perhaps some jurisdictions’ political climate will accept my original proposal.
One remedy related to jury instructions but that did not make it into the Act also deserves
mention. Too many courts are highly skeptical of expert testimony on the factors affecting the
voluntariness and accuracy of confessions.15 Yet the need for such testimony may be at its
greatest when police fail to videotape the entire interrogation process. Part of the point of such

11

”Unreliability” is one motivating factor for creation of the due process test excluding involuntary confessions. See
infra text accompanying notes 175-92.
12
See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY:
REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 67-78 (2006) (discussing a wide range of tools – corroboration requirements, broadened
discovery, improved jury instructions – for correcting the risk of jailhouse snitch testimony being unreliable).
13
See UERCIA §13(b).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 23-67.
15
See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 43 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that expert testimony on false confession’s
invades the province of the jury); State v. Davis, 32 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (similar, but also noting that
cross-examination is a sufficient safeguard against error); People v. Rivera, 777 N.E. 2d 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(concluding that expert testimony on false confessions concerned matters not yet “generally accepted”). But see
Solomon Fulero, Expert Psychological Testimony on the Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions, in
INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 247, 247-62 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed. 2004) (discussing cases
admitting such testimony, arguing that many more are unreported, and arguing that courts are likely in the future to
become more receptive).
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recording is to allow the jury to be fully informed of what occurred so that it may assess the risks
of error or undue law enforcement pressure. Where such recording is unavailable, and
particularly where there is no excuse for such unavailability, the jury is deprived of the best
evidence of what occurred. They are thus particularly in need of schooling on the factors raising
risks of inaccurate or coerced confessions because they are handicapped in making their own
judgments.16 An early draft of the Act thus provided expert testimony as one remedy for the
Act’s violation. But drafting a provision that did not open the door to speculative or baseless
expert testimony and that did not trench upon traditional judicial evidentiary prerogatives proved
difficult in the view of some drafting committee members. Moreover, judicial opposition proved
so fierce that efforts to improve upon the drafting product were simply abandoned. But that result
does not eliminate the need for expert advice. It is thus worth capturing a snapshot of where that
provision lay when abandoned to prompt debate on whether a workable alternative is feasible
and worth some jurisdiction’s pursuing.
The Act also assumed that some wily lawyers will figure out a way to create a civil cause of
action for the Act’s violation. The Act squarely prohibits civil suits on these grounds against
individual officers.17 But the Act prohibits suits against governmental entities, such as police
departments, only if they have adopted and implemented regulations reasonably designed to
accomplish the purposes of the Act.18 The Act specifies broad substantive and procedural matters
that such regulations must address, while leaving details to states or localities.19 This immunity
from civil suit provision was meant to be a carrot to encourage regulations that promote
accountability, efficiency, accuracy, and updating of interrogation matters covered by the Act. A

16

See infra text accompanying notes 268-86.
See UERCIA §16(b).
18
See id. §16(a).
19
See id. §15(b).
17
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variety of law enforcement organizations have voluntarily adopted such regulations, and a few
statutes contain proto-regulatory provisions.20 This article addresses the logic behind this
approach and the reasons for choosing the particular minimum set of topics that regulations must
address. The initial idea for this incentives-based regulatory approach, if not necessarily its
precise form, it is worth noting, came from law enforcement.
Although my focus is on the content of these remedial provisions, I comment at least briefly
throughout this article on the underlying politics. The drafting committee and its many interest
group (stakeholder) liaisons constituted a diverse lot. Judges, defense attorneys, police officers,
prosecutors, victims’ rights advocates, and a host of other interested parties were involved.
Moreover, no group’s views were monolithic. The strongest advocate for detailed, muscular
requirements and remedies was a well-respected senior law enforcement officer. Other officers
were more skeptical. Some prosecutors opposed any codification of recording requirements,
preferring to leave it entirely to individual local choice. But other prosecutors embraced statutory
regulation as the only sure way to promote prompt professionalization in this area, thereby
improving law enforcement’s accuracy, efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Some defense
attorneys wanted to record everything said by everyone in every situation, heedless of financial
cost or potential loss of truthful, uncoerced confessions. But other defense attorneys recognized
that incremental change is better than none and that law enforcement cannot be expected to
ignore its role in guarding public safety as part of the drafting equation.
This diversity was intentional. First, it built political support by educating members that
stereotypes about groups’ views were often wrong. Skeptical officers, for example, gave more
credence to arguments from advocates who were fellow officers than from advocates who were

20

See Thomas Sullivan, Police Department Regulations: Custodial Interrogation (2010) (collecting such
regulations).
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defense attorneys. Second, the diversity ensured, as much as is possible in a politically-charged
debate, that what left the drafting committee had wide support among and within many
stakeholder groups. That support improves the chances for actual enactment of the proposed
legislation. From the perspective of realpolitik, the Act is thus likely the best that can be
expected, and I applaud the ULC’s efforts and heartily endorse the Act.
But not every provision is, in my view, necessarily the best policy choice in a theoretical,
apolitical world. Indeed, the Act allows so much flexibility to localities, contains so many
exceptions, and has so few remedies --and ones that are of debatable effectiveness -- that some of
the most fervent supporters of this type of legislation were deeply disappointed. I think they are
wrong to be disappointed. The Act is a good one, and the ULC had to take into consideration
political obstacles that might arise in fifty states. Nevertheless, understanding why the fervent
activists’ were disappointed clarifies the policy issues at stake, helps to lay the ground work for
future statutory improvements, and may focus arguments for more robust change should some
jurisdictions prove receptive to it. On the other hand, these critics also miss some of the Act’s
conceptual breakthroughs and important strengths, and I want the opportunity to defend those
accomplishments. It is for these reasons that I have started this article’s title with the phrase,
“High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes.” The high expectations that the proponents of
change had for this Act have largely been met, but the wounded hopes of the most zealous of
those advocates also deserve their due.
The next section of this article, Part IIA, briefly reviews why there is a need for recording the
entire custodial interrogation process. Part IIB even more briefly summarizes the Act’s
provisions. Part III delves into the major remedies provided by the Act and those deleted from
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earlier drafts. Part IV elaborates further on the regulatory provisions. Part V, the conclusion,
summarizes the article’s key points and offers suggestions for the future.
II. The Need for, and Content of, the Act: An Overview
A. Need for the Legislation
In just the past two decades, lawyers have documented numerous cases of wrongful
convictions.21 In some instances, the true perpetrator continued to commit serious crime while an
innocent person languished in prison.22 The cases have been sufficiently numerous as to garner
the attention of the media, prosecutors, defense counsel, police, legislators, and law reformers.23
Some of this attention has been fostered by investigation into the causes of mistakes, causes that
suggest that the proven cases of wrongful conviction are but the tip of the iceberg.24 Most errors
were proven by DNA evidence.25 But such evidence is not usually available, again raising the
worry that large numbers of mistaken convictions will simply go undetected.26
Social science studies of wrongful convictions have demonstrated that one of the most
important contributors to error is the admissibility at trial of false confessions. 27 False
confessions may often occur no matter how well-meaning the interrogating officer or how strong
his or her belief in the suspect’s guilt.28 Subtle flaws in interrogation techniques can elicit
confessions by the innocent.29 Yet confessions are taken as such powerful evidence of guilt that

21

See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINALPROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5 (2011).
Id. at 3.
23
Id. at 6.
24
See generally BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD, and JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2001) (outlining what
errors led to numerous wrongful convictions- leading others to research that same question with greater intensity).
25
GARRETT, supra note 21, at, 6.
26
Id. at 11
27
See RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 291-96 (2010) (summarizing the history of
the movement for electronic recording).
28
See id. at 263-266 ( tunnel vision can lead interrogators to believe in suspect’s guilt while ignoring all other
evidence).
29
Id. at 73..
22
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prosecutors, jurors, and judges often fail to identify the false ones.30 The resulting wrongful
conviction means not only that an innocent person is incarcerated but that a dangerous offender
continues threatening public safety.31
The need for improving police training in interrogation techniques that will reduce the
risk of error and for improving prosecutor, jury, and judicial effectiveness in spotting mistakes
based upon false confessions is thus great. Moreover, constitutional principles require exclusion
of involuntary confessions and those taken without properly administering Miranda warnings,
yet defense and police witnesses often tell very different tales about the degree of coercion
involved in the interrogation process. This conflicting testimony sometimes results in judges or
jurors believing the wrong tale, other times allowing for frivolous suppression motions wasting
the court’s time and impugning careful, professional, and honest police officers.32
The need for recording thus has three broad justifications: promoting truth-finding,
efficiency, and constitutional values.33 Truth-finding is partly promoted by reducing lying and
deterring risky interrogation techniques because police and suspects both know they are being
watched.34 Detectives may also focus on their interrogation’s quality because they are freed from
the need to take notes.35 Recording allows supervisors to give feedback on proper techniques,
thereby improving training.36 Police and prosecutors are likewise able to review tapes to weed
out suspect cases early.37 Factfinders are better able to do their job because the recording can
refresh witness memories and provide a more complete and accurate picture of the full course of
30

See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1227, 1230-31 (2010)..
LEO, supra note 27, at 268.
32
See id. at 296-305.
33
See generally LEO, supra note 271, at 296-305 (elaborating on the justifications noted here).
34
Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1129 (2005) .
35
LEO, supra note 27, at 297.
36
Id. at 297.
37
Lisa Lewis, Rethinking Miranda: Truth, Lies, and Videotape, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 199, 222 (2008).
31
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events.38
Recording fosters systemic efficiency by reducing the number of frivolous suppression
motions or aiding in quick motion resolution whenever a defendant’s version of events is
contradicted by the recording.39 Prosecutor bargaining power is also enhanced for the same
reason, thus likely promoting more guilty pleas.40 By resolving factual doubts, recording makes
hung juries less likely.41 Police able to review a recording for the subtleties of body language and
of quick suspect comments may also better pick up on avenues for investigation or reasons to
confirm or dispute a defendant’s story, thus quickening the time needed for investigation.42
Constitutional values are protected by improving suppression motion resolution accuracy
and police training.43 Such values are also fostered because the wide availability of a largely
indisputable record of what occurred in the interrogation room both acts to deter governmental
overreaching and to expose it when it occurs.44 Recording makes it easier for the state to
preserve potential exculpatory evidence and to provide it to defense counsel, thus improving
compliance with generous notions of the Brady obligation to produce exculpatory evidence for
the defense.45 A recording can also reveal subtle, unconscious racial bias and encourage means
for correcting it and can, given the above advantages, promote law enforcement legitimacy by
improving its public accountability.46

38

Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1129.
LEO, supra note 27, at 297-298.
40
Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations, 88 JUDICATURE 132, 135
(2004)..
41
LEO, supra note 27, at 298.
42
Id. at 298.
43
Id. at 299.
44
Id. at 299
45
Id. at 300.46
See, e.g., Cynthia J. Nadjadowski, Explaining Racial Disparities in False Confession Rates, 31 AM. PSYCH.-L.
SOC’Y NEWS 6-11 (Summer 2011) (discussing the role of racial stereotype threat in leading to false confessions);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Risk Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
121 (2006) (discussing some data and the likely processes by which unconscious racial bias can
39
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For just these reasons, many academics have recommended,47 and several states have
statutorily-mandated,48 electronic recording of the entire custodial interrogation process, from the
start of questioning to the end of the suspect’s confessing, as a way to solve these and related
problems. For example, Illinois, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have adopted mandatory recording laws for a variety of
felony investigations.49 Alaska, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have recording requirements
imposed by judicial decision.50 The New Jersey Supreme Court has likewise required recording,
doing so via court rule, as has the Indiana Supreme Court just recently.51 A significant number
of state reviewing courts have declared that recording would have powerful benefits for the
justice system but have declined to impose that obligation absent legislative action.52
The military has also begun embracing the recording ideal. For example, the United
States Naval Criminal Investigative Service (USNCIS) Manual now contains General Order 000012, which requires video or audio recording of suspect interrogations of crimes of violence
where the interrogation takes place in a Naval Criminal Investigative Service facility.53
Similarly, in October 2009, the Commission on Military Justice, known as the Cox Commission,
contribute to false confessions).; Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1077, 1081-90 (2011) (discussing importance of police accountability and transparency and its connection to
procedural justice and perceived law enforcement legitimacy).
47
See generally; Tracy Lamar Wright, Let's Take Another Look at That: False Confession, Interrogation, and the
Case for Electronic Recording, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 251 (2007).
48
See infra text accompanying notes 50-51..
49
See Thomas P. Sullivan and Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement Officials’ Failure to Record
Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 216-7 (2009).
50
See id. at 216-17.
51
See id. at 217; see Order Amending [Indiana] Rules of Evidence, [Rule 617], No. 94S00-0909-MS-4 (filed
September 15, 2009) (requiring, subject to seven narrow exceptions, audio and video recording of custodial
interrogations in all felony prosecutions). See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law in Jurisdictions Requiring
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 4 (2010) (referencing a complete list of
states that have enacted recording laws, whether by statute, rule, or judicial decision, including New Jersey and
Indiana, as of 2010).
52
See Sullivan and Vail, supra note 50, at 216-17 n.8.
53
See U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, General Order 00-0012, Policy Change Regarding Recording of
Interrogations.
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released a report concluding that principles of justice, equity, and fairness require “military law
enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial interrogations of crime suspects at
law enforcement offices, detention centers, or other places where suspects are held for
questioning, or, where videotaping is not practicable, to audiotape the entirety of such custodial
interrogations.”54 The Air Force Judge Advocate General also declared that it would start
recording all subject interviews as of October 2009, though there are limited exceptions, and
recording of witness and victim interviews is optional.55 Furthermore, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, in Section 1080, requires that “each strategic
intelligence interrogation” (one conducted in a “theater-level detention facility”) of persons in
the custody of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense (DOD) shall be “videotaped
or otherwise electronically recorded.”56 The Section requires the Judge Advocate General to
develop implementing guidelines.57
A significant number of police departments have also voluntarily adopted the recording
solution.58 Yet the vast majority of police departments still do not record.59 Moreover, there are
wide variations among the state provisions and the voluntarily-adopted programs.60
Furthermore, some approaches promise to be more effective in protecting the innocent,
54

See Thomas P. Sullivan, Departments that Currently Record a Majority of Custodial Interrogations 8 n.25
(December 2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, Departments that Record]; see also
http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform/MERI_resources/$FILE/Deptsthatcurrentlyrecord(asof11210).pdf (last
visited August 11, 2011 (compiling a list the most up-to-date list of departments that currently record
interrogations.)
55
See Sullivan, Departments That Record, supra note 55, . at 8 n. 25.; Judge Advocate General On-line News
Service, August 26, 2009.
56
Sullivan, Departments That Record, supra, note 55, at 8 n.26.
57
See id.
58
See Sullivan and Vail, supra note 50, at 228-34 (listing all such departments, a list encompassing departments in
forty states who have voluntarily adopted recording; when the states having mandated recording are added, all fifty
states plus the District of Columbia have at least one police department engaged in recording in at least some cases).
59
See Courtney A. Lawrence, Criminal Law: Too Much of A Good Thing: Limiting the Scope of the Scales
Recording Requirement to Custodial Interrogations Conducted in Minnesota-State v. Sanders, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 325, 331 (2010). (elucidating the history of electronic recording).
60
Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1131 (2005).
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convicting the guilty, minimizing coercion, and avoiding frivolous suppression motions than
others.61 Additionally, the further spread of the recording process throughout states and
localities has been slow when its promised benefits are great.62 A uniform statute may help to
speed informed resolution of the recording issue. It was in recognition of these needs that the
ULC, after a two-year-long drafting process, thus promulgated the Uniform Act for the
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations (the Act) that is the subject of this article.63
B. The Act’s Major Provisions Summarized
The Act is organized into twenty-three sections. Section one merely contains the
Act’s title.64 Section two contains definitions.65 Section three mandates the electronic recording
of the entire custodial interrogation process by law enforcement, leaving it to individual states to
decide where and for what types of wrongs this mandate applies, as well as the means by which
recording must be done.66
Concerning the “where,” states must choose among no locational limitation, limiting the
mandate to places of detention, or covering both places of detention and all other locations but
varying the means by which recording must be done (audio and video at places of detention, only
audio at other locations).67 Concerning the means – the how – states may choose to mandate only
audio, audio and video, or, as just noted, audio and video at a place of detention, only audio
elsewhere.68 As for the type of legal violation to which the electronic recording mandate applies,

61

Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1140 (stating that there is much opposition to expansion, especially from those that would benefit the most
from its creation; the police.)
63
See UERCIA, available as adopted at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Moa5uoEb1MJ:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/2010final.htm+UAERCI+legal&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&source=www.
google.com ( last visited August 11, 2011).
64
See UERCIA §1.
65
Id. § 2.
66
Id. .§ 3.
67
Id. .§.3
68
Id. .§.3
62
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jurisdictions must choose among felonies, crimes, delinquent acts, offenses, or some
combination.69 Moreover, each state must identify by section numbers to which
specific violations within each chosen category the mandate applies.70
The Act thus permits states to vary the scope of the mandate based upon local
variations in cost, perceived degree of need for different categories of criminal or delinquent
wrongdoing, or other pressing local considerations. Nevertheless, combined audio and video
recording remains the ideal, and the advantages of recording exist wherever custodial
interrogation occurs and for whatever criminal or delinquent wrong is involved. Therefore, states
choosing less than the maximum scope permitted by the options offered in Section 3 remain free
over time to expand that scope as transitional and other costs decline.
These mandates are further limited by Section two’s definition of “custodial
interrogation” as “questioning or other conduct by a law enforcement officer which is reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from an individual and occur[ring] when reasonable
individuals in the same circumstances would consider themselves in custody.”71 This definition
largely matches that in Miranda v. Arizona,72 as that decision’s meaning was understood by the
United States Supreme Court at the time of this Act’s drafting.73 However, the definition is still a
statutory one, not expressly linked in its text to Miranda, because it is possible that Miranda will
in the future be abandoned, or its meaning substantially altered, by future Court interpretation.74
69

Id. .§.3
Id.§.3.. See also D.C. Code § 5-116.01. (making it mandatory in Washinton, D.C. to tape interrogations only of
crimes of violence as defined by D.C. Code § 23-1331).
71
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (defining “custody”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
421 (1984) (concluding that an ordinary traffic stop does not place the driver in “custody”); Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defining “interrogation”).
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See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s recent
interpretation of Miranda has gutted its protections and that police training manuals support this conclusion); Yale

15

Nevertheless, the close tracking to current understandings of the Miranda rule narrows the Act’s
scope while triggering the electronic mandate under circumstances that have been familiar to law
enforcement for over four decades. Additionally, for clarity, Section three also expressly declares
that it does not require the recording of spontaneous statements made outside the course of a
custodial interrogation or in response to questions routinely asked during the processing of the
arrest of an individual,75 though those situations do not constitute custodial interrogations under
current post-Miranda case law.76
Section four does not, however, require informing the individual being interrogated that
the interrogation is being recorded.77 Section four exempts electronic recording of custodial
interrogations from state statutory requirements, if any, that an individual consent to the
recording of the individual’s conversations.78 The last sentence in section four emphasizes,
however, that no law enforcement officer or agency may record a private communication
between an individual and the individual’s lawyer.79
Sections five through ten outline a variety of exceptions from the recording mandate.
Section five creates an exception for exigent circumstances. Section six creates an exception
where the individual interrogated refuses to participate if the interrogation is electronically
recorded, though Section six does, if feasible, require the electronic recording of the
interrogatee’s refusal to speak if his statements will be electronically recorded.80 Section seven

Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV.
929, 934 (1995).(arguing more than a decade ago that the Court was eviscerating Miranda).
75
See UERCIA .§.3.
76
See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (routine booking exception); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975,
991 (9th Cir. 2002) (Miranda warnings not required because defendant spontaneously blurted out statements to
psychiatrist).
77
See UERCIA .§.4.
78
Id. .§.4. see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.073 (West).
79
See UERCIA §.4.; cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing the function of the
attorney client privilege).
80
Id. §.6
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excepts custodial interrogations conducted in other jurisdictions in compliance with their law.81
Section eight excepts custodial interrogations conducted when the interrogator reasonably
believes that the offense involved is not one that the statute mandates must be recorded.82 Section
nine excepts custodial interrogations from electronic recording where the law enforcement
officer or his superior reasonably believes that electronic recording would reveal a confidential
informant’s identity or jeopardize the safety of the officer, the person interrogated, or another
individual.83 Section ten creates an exception for equipment malfunctions occurring despite the
existence of reasonable maintenance efforts and where timely repair or replacement is not
feasible.84 Although a few of these “exceptions” outline circumstances that would likely not fit
the definitions of “custody” or “interrogation,” thus not requiring electronic recording in the first
place,85 those exceptions are nevertheless included to resolve any ambiguity and to offer quickand-easy guidance to specific situations that will aid law enforcement in readily complying with
the Act.
Section eleven places the burden of persuasion as to the application of an exception on
the prosecution by a preponderance of the evidence.86 Section twelve requires the state to notify
the defense of an intention to rely on an exception if the state intends to do so in its case-inchief.87
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Id. §.7.
Id. § 8.
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See UERCIA .§.9.; cf. Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custodial Interviews, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1297,
1343 (2008).(explaining why a confidential informant should not have to be electronically recorded).
84
Id. .§.10.
85
See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS, & LENESE HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 726-40 (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing and analyzing cases and scholarship defining “custody” and
“interrogation” under Miranda)..
86
See UERCIA .§11.; cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 497 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (holding that the state’s “heavy burden”
under Miranda is a preponderance of the evidence).
87
Id. §,12.
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Section 13 outlines procedural remedies for violation of the Act’s requirement that the
entire custodial interrogation process be electronically recorded – remedies that come into play,
of course, only if no exceptions apply. Section 13(a) declares that the court shall consider failure
to comply with the Act in ruling on a motion to suppress a confession as involuntary.88 This
subsection does not mandate suppression for violation of the Act but merely mandates
consideration of the relevance and weight of the failure to record by the trial judge in deciding
whether to suppress on grounds of the involuntariness of the statement.89 Bracketed language
extends this same approach to confessions that are “not reliable,” even though they may be
voluntary.90 If the judge admits the Act-violative confession, Section 13(b) mandates that the
trial judge give a cautionary instruction to the jury.91
Section 14 mandates that electronic recordings of custodial interrogations be identified,
accessible, and preserved.92 Preservation must be done in the manner prescribed by local statutes
or rules governing the preservation of evidence in criminal cases generally.93
Section 15 requires each law enforcement agency (alternatively, in brackets, the “state
agency charged with monitoring law enforcement’s compliance with this act” or the “appropriate
state authority”) to adopt and enforce rules to implement this Act.94 Subsection (b) specifies a
small number of matters that these rules must address, including (1) the manner in which an
electronic recording of a custodial interrogations must be made; (2) the collection and review of
electronic recording data, or the absence thereof, by superiors within the law enforcement
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agency; (3) the assignment of supervisory responsibilities and a chain of command to promote
internal accountability; (4) a process for explaining noncompliance with procedures and
imposing administrative sanctions for failures to comply that are not justified; (5) a supervisory
system expressly imposing on specific individuals a duty to ensure adequate staffing, education,
training, and material resources to implement this [act]; and (6) a process for monitoring the
chain of custody of electronic recordings of custodial interrogations.95 Bracketed subsection (c)
further requires that the rules adopted for video recording under subsection (a) must contain
standards for the angle, focus, and field of vision of a recording device that reasonably promote
accurate recording of a custodial interrogation at a place of detention and reliable assessment of
its accuracy and completeness.96 This subsection is bracketed because it is required only in
jurisdictions that require both audio and video recording at a place of detentionSection 16
concerns limitation of liability. Subsection (a) declares that a law enforcement agency in the state
that has implemented procedures reasonably designed to enforce the rules adopted pursuant to
section 15(a) is not subject to civil liability for damages arising from a violation of the Act.97
Subsection 16(a) is thus linked to the rule-writing and implementation provisions of Section 15.98
Subsection 16(b) declares that the Act does not create a right of action against an individual law
enforcement officer.99
Section 17 makes electronic recordings of custodial interrogations presumptively selfauthenticating in any pretrial or post-trial proceeding if accompanied by a certificate of
authenticity by an appropriate law enforcement officer sworn under oath.100 However,
95
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authenticity may otherwise be challenged in whatever way the law of a particular state
provides.101
Sections 18 through 23 address technical matters. These technical matters, for example,
address severability should any one provision of the Act be held unconstitutional and declare that
the Act does not create a defense right to recording.102
In sum, the Act leaves individual jurisdictions free to decide the crimes to which, and the
locations at which, the recording requirement applies. Jurisdictions are similarly free to decide
whether recording must be by audio or also by video, including freedom to require audio only in
some locations, audio and video in other locations. Whatever choices jurisdictions make on these
matters, however, the requirement kicks in only for “custodial” interrogations, as currently
defined by Miranda and its progeny. In its rulemaking provisions, the Act also includes a
requirement of explaining why recording was done outside a specified location, if a jurisdiction
chooses to limit the recording mandate only to certain spaces.103 The Act thus assumes that at
least some custodial interrogations will be recorded and seeks to encourage expanding
recording’s use wherever feasible. But the scope of the mandate remains in individual
jurisdiction’s hands in the hope that recording in some instances is better than none and that
experiences with recording are likely to be so positive, and costs so likely to decline over time,
that jurisdictions will choose to expand recording’s use widely, even if they initially choose to
employ it stingily. Furthermore, the Act includes numerous exceptions to cover a wide range of
101

Id. §17. ; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2538-39 (2009) (noting that there is an exception to
the usual Confrontation Clause protections for a clerk’s certificate merely authenticating an official record rather
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potential complications. On the political front, the flexibility provided by the Act and its
permitting slow, incremental changes as individual jurisdictions see fit was thought likely to
improve the chances of widespread adoption. States fearing high costs, for example, could
choose narrow application, while those persuaded by the argument that any minimal out-ofpocket costs would be far outweighed by long-term benefits could choose broader application.
The more unusual and interesting provisions of the Act, however, are those involving
remedies and regulations. It is thus to remedies that the next section of this article turns.
III. Remedies
The Act provides for several remedies. First among these is a very limited suppression
remedy, second cautionary jury instructions. In both instances, the Act once again provides
jurisdictions substantial freedom of choice. The Act also protects against civil liability as a
remedy if certain regulations are adopted and enforced. This part of this article discusses each of
these remedies, plus the fate of one remedy – expert testimony – ultimately excluded from the
Act. Details on the required regulations to avoid civil liability are left to a later section on
rulemaking.
A. Pretrial Suppression Motions
The remedy that initiated the most heated discussion was the potential for suppressing
evidence based upon violating the Act. The theory behind a suppression remedy was that it
would provide a strong incentive for compliance with the Act.104 Moreover, as is discussed
shortly, it would help to avoid wrongful convictions by excluding evidence of doubtful
trustworthiness, or at least evidence whose trustworthiness could not fairly be evaluated by the
104

Id. §13(a) (creating modest suppression remedy). I am reporting here on the internal debates held in the ULC
drafting committee.. See also Christopher Slobogin, Transnational Law and Regulation of the Police, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 451, 455 (2006) (arguing that a properly-designed combination of civil penalties and administrative action
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fact finder.105 Additionally, the Act’s exceptions were so numerous and covered every legitimate
reason for not recording (indeed including a catchall “exigent circumstances” exception)106 that
exclusion would be rare and, when it occurred, would likely involve either intentional
wrongdoing or extreme negligence, thus making suppression fully justifiable.107
Opponents of the suppression remedy, however, argued that there are already
constitutional grounds for excluding involuntary confessions.108 Furthermore, in their view,
voluntary confessions are still trustworthy, that is, unlikely to create an unacceptable risk of
convicting the innocent.109 Moreover, to the extent that trustworthiness is in doubt, they saw
cautionary jury instructions as an adequate corrective.110 Additionally, opponents viewed
exclusion as a harsh sanction, particularly where the police have done no “wrong,” that is, not
engaged in tactics sufficiently coercive to overcome the accused’s will. Furthermore, the
constitution provides other remedies for suppressing confessions that are not involuntary,
including violation of the Miranda warnings rule and the right to counsel.111 To add yet another
independent ground for suppression seemed like overkill.
105

See infra text accompanying notes 167-232.
See UERCIA .§. 5-10.
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Because the exceptions cover nearly all conceivable accidental or unavoidable circumstances where recording
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Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
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negligence standard for suppression under the exclusionary rule); Davis v. United States, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4560,
*19-20, (2011) (declaring that exclusionary rule applies under the Fourth Amendment only to deliberate or grossly
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To address opponent’s concerns, the Act does not create an independent ground for
suppression because of the failure to comply with the Act’s recording requirements. But the Act
does declare that its violation may be considered as a factor in the voluntariness determination.112
The Act also suggests in brackets that jurisdictions adopt a provision permitting suppression
based upon a confession’s unreliability – that is, where there is serious reason to doubt its
accuracy in its essential points – even if there is no coercive police conduct.113 These provisions
thus prevent suppression merely because recording has not taken place as the Act requires.
Rather, suppression is permitted only on other grounds, with the failure to record a relevant
factor. If that failure tips the scale under the totality of the circumstances, then the confession
might be suppressed because it was involuntarily given or unreliable but not simply because it
was unrecorded or improperly recorded.
Among the virtues of this approach is its increased likelihood of gaining political support.
It is also better than making violation of the Act entirely irrelevant to suppression on any ground
given the limitations of the only other criminal case remedy – jury instructions – to be discussed
below. It is, however, a remedy that still turns on a trial judge’s weighing of numerous
circumstances, giving trial judges enormous discretion.114 Where judges have such discretion,
they rarely suppress, except in the most unusual or extreme of cases.115 Furthermore, as noted
above, it is hard to violate the Act in the first place because of its many exceptions.116 If this
point is understood and accepted, that too should aid in enactability. But the approach has vices
too, arising precisely from the likely rarity of suppression in practice, as this article soon
112
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explains.117 Ultimately, the approach is a wise one, but it is a wise compromise, not a perfect
ideal.
1. General Scope and Nature of This Remedy and of Its Justification
Remember that the Act does not mandate exclusion of evidence as a remedy. But it does
recognize in subsection 13 (a) that the failure to comply with the terms of the Act may be
considered relevant in resolving a motion to suppress a confession, including (but not limited to)
doing so on the grounds of its involuntariness or unreliability.118 In doing so, this Act navigates
among the inflexible rule of per se exclusion in some states, the presumed inadmissibility in
other states, the overly-complex balancing approaches recommended by some law reformers,
and the complete abandonment of even the possibility of an exclusionary remedy in one state.119
The most likely grounds for suppression are that the accused gave his statement
involuntarily,120 that it was unreliable,121 or that it violated Miranda.122 The Act emphasizes the
first two grounds as most relevant and important, where the need for recording is at its highest,123
but it uses the word “including” to acknowledge that non-recording may further be relevant to
pretrial suppression on other grounds, including other federal constitutional ones, but also
various state grounds, particularly in states that have exercised their authority (either on statutory
or state constitutional grounds) to specify additional grounds for suppression of statements
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generally.124 Where this occurs, however, unjustified non-recording would still need to be
“considered” in the pretrial motion but would not necessarily result in exclusion of the evidence.
Even the possibility of non-recording’s being a consideration in suppression motions, of course,
generally arises only when Miranda warnings would also be required (the existence of a
“custodial interrogation” being a necessary trigger for the Act’s provisions),125 the offense is one
covered by this Act (in most states, this is likely initially to be a relatively small subset of all
crimes), and one of the Act’s extensive set of exceptions does not apply. That is likely to be the
unusual case, albeit an important situation in which the exclusionary possibility should be
contemplated.
Indeed, at least seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted, by statute, court
rule, or judicial decision, some version of the exclusionary rule for non-recording of the entire
custodial interrogation process.126 These states are in widely disparate areas of the country:
Alaska (the Northwest); Minnesota, Indiana, and Illinois (the Midwest); New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and DC (the Northeast); North Carolina (the South), and arguably Montana – there is
some statutory ambiguity for this state (the West).127
Moreover, although a per se rule of inadmissibility might have the greatest deterrent
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effect and be easily administrable,128 such a rule’s inflexibility is also why it is the version of the
exclusionary rule most likely to face resistance. Such resistance stems from the sense by some
lawmakers that exclusion is a harsh remedy to be deployed only where truly needed. Alaska,
Indiana, and Minnesota (in Minnesota, for substantial violations only) have adopted just such a
simple, rigid rule, showing that its adoption is nevertheless not beyond political reach in at least
some states that apparently rejected the characterization of exclusion as “unduly harsh.”129
Nevertheless, exclusion is generally understood as a remedy turning on a cost-benefit
analysis.130 Among the primary social benefits of an exclusionary remedy for violation of this
Act’s electronic recording mandate are deterring future violations, protecting accuracy in factfinding, protecting against false confessions occurring in the first place,131 and adding a statutory
layer of protection to other relevant constitutional rights, such as the due process right to be free
128
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from coercive interrogations132 and the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
custodial interrogations, including the Miranda prophylactic protection of that right.133 But
where violation of the Act has only minimally implicated these social interests, the cost of
suppression may not be worth the benefits. Therefore, the Act merely requires the trial court to
consider the relevance and weight of violation of the electronic recording mandate in pretrial
suppression motion decisions.
Merely stating that the unjustified lack of recording should be “considered” simply leaves
its weight undefined, however, perhaps suggesting that a trial judge should be free to give the
lack of recording decisive weight. Some jurisdictions may trust the trial court to make precisely
just such decisions as among those commonly made in pretrial motions. For jurisdictions
seeking to make it clear, however, that nonrecording should never alone be sufficient to justify
exclusion, bracketed language declares that the trial judge may consider exclusion as only “a
factor” in the suppression balancing analysis.134 On the other hand, rendering violation of the
Act irrelevant to pre-trial suppression motions would not adequately serve the Act’s goals in
cases where the interests the Act serves are substantially implicated, a point explained more fully
below.
Statutory mandates for decision-makers to consider factors without requiring that they
thereby decide a particular way are common. In the area of constitutional law, one well-known
such statute was unsuccessfully challenged as violating free speech rights in NEA v. Finley.135
There, Congress amended the statute governing National Endowment of the Arts (NEA)
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procedures for awarding grants to encourage proposed artistic endeavors. The amended statute
directed the NEA chairperson, in establishing procedures for determining the artistic merit of
grant applications, to “take into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs of the American public.” Several grant-applicants denied funding sued the NEA,
claiming that the statute as applied had violated their First Amendment right to free speech by
directing funding-denial for projects espousing a particular viewpoint.
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected this reading of the statute. First,
explained the Court, mandating that an agency “consider” a matter in its deliberations decidedly
does not categorically require funding denial. Second, the legislative history expressly revealed
that Congress rejected any categorical consequences of such consideration, noting, for example,
that an independent Commission advising Congress on the matter declared in its report that new
grant-selection criteria “should be incorporated as part of the selection process … rather than
isolated and treated as exogenous considerations.”136 The Court therefore viewed the statutory
provision in Finley as “aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding speech,”137 thereby
undermining “respondents’ argument that the provision inevitably will be utilized as a tool for
invidious viewpoint discrimination.”138
Relatedly, the Court rejected the claim that if the mandate to “consider” a factor does not
require a particular result on the statute’s face, it will render the statute so impermissibly vague
and subjective as to allow the agency to be thoroughly unconstrained, again permitting invidious
discrimination to occur below the radar. A mandate to “consider” a factor is no more vague,
however, concluded the Court, than the ultimate question to which this consideration contributes
to an answer: whether the grant application is for a project that is likely to exemplify “artistic
136
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excellence.”139 Only a case-by-case consideration of a wide array of information can lead to a
decision on such a question in an individual case.
Here, as in Finley, this Act imposes a procedural, not substantive, requirement that
breach of the Act’s recording mandate be considered in deciding suppression motions on other
grounds. The word “consider,” again as in Finley, thus does not imply or require a result in a
particular case. The “legislative history” in states that adopt the Act can further emphasize this
point, as was also true in Finley. Furthermore, the word “consider” is no more vague than, for
example, the word “involuntariness,” one ultimate ground for suppression to which consideration
of these Act’s mandates applies, and a test that has long survived judicial scrutiny.140 Granted,
Finley involved an agency rather than a court. This is a distinction without a difference, for
legislative mandates for courts to “consider” certain factors in making case-specific judgments
are likewise common,141 and, in any event, nothing in the Finley Court’s reading of text or the
rest of its rationale sensibly limits it to the agency context.
It also might be argued that a statute may not “mandate” that anything be considered in
making a constitutional decision because constitutions trump statutes.142 This argument fails for
several reasons. First, the constitutional question whether a confession is “voluntary” is to be
made based upon the “totality of the circumstances.”143 Among the recording mandate’s
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purposes is to give the courts a fuller picture of the circumstances relevant to a confession’s
voluntariness (by recording the events fully and as they actually unfolded) and a stronger
appreciation of the significance for the voluntariness determination of the absence of that fuller
picture.144 That absence occurs where recording that should have taken place did not. Violation
of the Act’s recording mandate thus logically entails its consideration in the “totality of the
circumstances” test of voluntariness. For similar reasons, violation of the Act’s recording
mandate should be relevant in determining “reliability.”
Violation of the Act’s mandates should, of course, always be relevant to any pretrial
motion in the sense that the court is deprived of the best evidence of just what the facts were,
including subtleties of tone, voice, and expression. Moreover, the mere fact of such unjustified
non-recording may be relevant in resolving credibility disputes. The Act does spell out this logic
and its consequences by mandating that courts consider the Act’s violation in the voluntariness
and other relevant inquiries.145 But doing so does not require any outcome concerning whether
the confession in the particular case was indeed constitutional or not. That decision remains the
judge’s in the individual case. There is thus no conflict between statute and constitution. Several
jurisdictions, to be discussed shortly, have indeed seen no such conflict.146
Furthermore, even were a court to disagree, the Act can and should be understood as
creating a statutory ground for suppression of a confession on grounds of involuntariness (if
bracketed language is adopted, also on grounds of unreliability), albeit a ground that is coterminus with the constitutional due process involuntariness doctrine, with the sole exception
that violation of the Act’s recording mandates must be considered in the voluntariness
determination, even if such consideration is not otherwise constitutionally required. Indeed, to
144
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avoid any confusion on this ground, the Act spells out involuntariness (and, for jurisdictions
adopting bracketed language, unreliability) as a specifically-identified ground for suppression.147
2. A Comparison to Other Jurisdictions in Greater Detail
Remember that Alaska and Minnesota have adopted a simple, rigid rule of per se
exclusion for violation of their recording mandates.148 Washington, DC creates a softer rule of
presumed inadmissibility that can be rebutted by clear and convincing prosecution evidence that
the statement was nevertheless voluntary.149 Illinois also creates a rule of presumed
inadmissibility that can be rebutted but differs from the DC rule in two ways: (1) the prosecution
must prove not only that the statement was voluntarily given but also that it is reliable, given the
totality of the circumstances; and (2) the prosecution’s burden of proving these matters is only a
preponderance of the evidence.150 Montana seems to follow a variant of the Illinois rule. Thus
the Montana statute declares that a judge “shall admit statements or evidence of statements that
do not conform to … [the recording mandate] if, at a hearing, the state proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that … the statements have been voluntarily made and are
reliable” or that certain exceptions apply.151
The Illinois and Montana rules in particular permit trial use of statements inexcusably
obtained in violation of the recording mandate if the reliability concerns arising from the
recording’s absence are allayed by other evidence.152 Accordingly, these states accept the idea
that a remedy for violation of recording requirements must aim at fact finding accuracy, not only
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at deterrence.153 Because the prosecution has the opportunity to prove that its non-compliance
has created no harm, exclusion will be applied less frequently under this approach than under a
per se rule of inadmissibility and will kick in primarily where there is substantial reason to worry
that we are in danger of convicting the wrong man.
Other states have created still softer versions of the exclusionary rule. New Jersey, for
example, provides that an unexcused failure to record is a factor for the court to consider in
deciding whether to admit a confession.154 Where, as in New Jersey, non-recording is but one
factor in a case-specific weighing process, there is ample room for a statement obtained in
violation of recording mandates nevertheless to be admitted.155 Yet the uncertainty—the
remaining possibility of exclusion in a particular case—still provides an incentive for police
compliance.156
On the other hand, if the confession is admitted, New Jersey then requires that a
cautionary jury instruction be given.157 Exclusion and jury instructions can thus be seen, as they
are in New Jersey, as complementary rather than alternative remedies. North Carolina follows a
similar approach, making an unexcused failure to record admissible to prove that a statement was
involuntary or unreliable but, if the confession is nevertheless admitted, requiring a jury
instruction warning that the jury may consider evidence of non-compliance in deciding whether a
statement was voluntary and reliable.158 Montana likewise provides for a cautionary instruction
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if a motion to suppress a non-compliant, unrecorded statement is denied.159
Indeed, of the states that have enacted recording statutes with remedies, apparently only
Wisconsin (arguably) and Nebraska (definitely) explicitly limit the remedy solely to a cautionary
jury instruction or, in a bench trial in Wisconsin, permits the judge to consider the weight of the
recording requirement violation in judging the worth of the confession.160 Maine, Maryland, and
New Mexico are simply silent about remedies, which may or may not preclude the courts from
crafting their own.161
Although not yet adopted by any state, there is still another approach to the exclusionary
rule: that proposed by the Constitution Project, which itself adopted a variant of an early
proposal by the American Law Institute.162 The Constitution Project brings together, in a search
for common ground, groups with opposing views on issues central to maintaining liberty in a
constitutional republic.163 The Project’s Death Penalty Initiative recommended electronic
recording of the entire custodial interrogation process in capital cases and also recommended a
unique exclusionary remedy for violations of that mandate.164 Both the Constitution Project and
ALI versions of an exclusionary remedy, however, relied on a detailed, complex balancing
process to guide judges, a process unnecessarily complex and therefore not adopted in the Act.165
Instead, the Act, while sharing balancing of interests with the Constitution Project and ALI
approaches to exclusion, trusts judges to be capable of making this sort of judgment, one with
which they are well familiar in other areas, without the need for greater specificity or undue
159
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limitation on their fact finding and balancing discretion.
3. The Act’s Approach to Suppression Redux: Unreliability as a Ground for Pretrial
Motions
The approach of this Act is to fuse aspects of the Illinois and New Jersey approaches.
Illinois requires that the prosecutor prove by a preponderance of the evidence both that an
unrecorded statement was voluntary and that it was reliable – an approach seemingly adopted by
Montana as well.166 Absent such proof, exclusion of the confession is mandated.167 North
Carolina similarly recognizes both involuntariness and unreliability as grounds for suppressing a
confession.168 The ULC Act, unlike that in Illinois, never mandates the exclusionary remedy but
makes violation of the Act one factor in the admissibility decision.169 In this respect, this Act’s
approach mirrors New Jersey’s, which also makes the failure to record but one factor in the
admissibility decision.170 But, unlike New Jersey, but like Illinois, Montana, and North Carolina,
the ULC Act expressly recognizes two potential grounds for excluding a confession based at
least partly on the failure to record: that failure’s relevance to proving the confession’s
involuntariness and its relevance to proving the confession’s unreliability.171
The latter ground for suppression is not one routinely recognized in constitutional law or
in most state statutory law as a ground for suppression of confessions,172 though, as noted above,
several states have recently done so in the precise context of non-recording.173 Accordingly, in
many states this Act might create a new basis for potential exclusion of a confession—and it is
166
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worth emphasizing again that this is only potential exclusion via a multi-factor weighing process
and only if none of the exceptions to the Act are met. Because of the novelty of this approach in
many, though by no means all, states, further comment on the role of reliability in suppression
motions is warranted. Relative novelty is also why the language of reliability in this section is
bracketed.
The most common constitutional grounds for suppression of confessions are violations of
the Miranda rule and the involuntariness of the confession under the due process clauses of the
United States Constitution.174 A confession is “involuntary” only if coercive police activity has
overborne the suspect’s will.175
A complex of values underlies this involuntariness rule.176 The rule’s most obvious
concern seems to be with the suspect’s autonomy, that is, with preventing his decision to confess
from being the result of his voluntary choice.177 Yet the rule aims in part to deter the state from
being the cause of such involuntariness, so the rule applies only when the state has placed undue
pressure upon a suspect to confess.178 Thus, in Colorado v. Connelly, 179 Connelly on his own
approached a police officer, confessed that he had murdered someone, and asked to talk about it.
The trial court suppressed Connelly’s confession, however, on involuntariness grounds after
hearing expert testimony concluding that Connelly suffered from a psychosis at the time of his
confession that compromised his ability to make free and rational choices. The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was
no coercive police activity that rendered his confession one not freely made. Mental illness, not
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the state, was at fault. Accordingly, no due process violation had occurred. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court famously said, “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence, whether true or false.”180
Read in isolation, this quote might suggest that the majority was thoroughly unconcerned
with “reliability,” that is, with whether there is good reason to trust that the confession was
truthful, the defendant therefore guilty. But that impression would be misleading, for in other
cases the Court, lower courts, and commentators have recognized that one important function of
the voluntariness test is to reduce the chances of convicting the innocent.181 The Court’s point
was that the danger of wrongful convictions is not alone sufficient to violate due process. The
exclusionary rule’s purpose in this area is to deter police overreaching.182 Where there is no such
overreaching to deter, the due process clauses are irrelevant, despite the risk to the accuracy of
the adjudication of guilt.183 Yet the Court recognized that a fundamental purpose of a criminal
trial is to admit “truthful and probative evidence before state juries. . . .”184 The Court
additionally recognized that, even where coercive police activity is lacking, “this sort of inquiry
. . . [may] be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence. . . . A statement
rendered by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this is
a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum.”185
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, squarely addressed the reliability question.
Brennan’s main point of disagreement with the majority was that he thought that free will and
reliability, not overreaching by police officers, should be the sole constitutional due process
inquiries.186 Explained Brennan:
Since the Court redefines voluntary confessions to include confessions by
mentally ill individuals, the reliability of these confessions becomes a central
concern. A concern for reliability is inherent in our criminal justice system,
which relies upon accusatorial rather than inquisitorial practices. While an
inquisitorial system prefers obtaining confessions from criminal defendants, an
accusatorial system must place its faith in determinations of “guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured.”187
Furthermore, said Brennan, “We have learned the lessons of history, ancient and modern,”
namely, that “a system of law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in
the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses” than a system dependent upon skillful
independent investigation.188 Indeed, Brennan was particularly concerned about false or
unreliable confessions because of their “decisive impact on the adversarial process.”189 He
explained, “Triers of fact accord confessions such heavy weight in their determinations that ‘the
introduction of a confession makes other aspects of a trial superfluous, and the real trial, for all
practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained.’”190 Thus, he concluded, “[b]ecause
the admission of a confession so strongly tips the balance against the defendant in the adversarial
process, we must be especially careful about a confession’s reliability.”191
In other areas of due process, the Court has reaffirmed that police overreaching is indeed
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a requirement for a due process violation.192 But the Court has also made its continuing concern
with the reliability of fact finding under the due process clauses evident.193 A particularly apt
example is the Court’s due process analysis of eyewitness identifications, such as lineups or
photo-spreads.194 The Court will not suppress an identification resulting from a suggestive
identification procedure unless that suggestion was unnecessarily created by the police.195 But if
the police have overreached in this area, the sole remaining question for the Court in deciding the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification procedure is reliability.196 Indeed, says the Court,
reliability is the “linchpin” of the analysis.197 The Court will go even further and under certain
conditions suppress an in-court identification if it is the fruit of an unreliable out-of-court one.198
The reason for this is that the reliability of the in-court identification then itself becomes
suspect.199
Custodial interrogations by definition involve state action.200 Similarly, motions to
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suppress confessions resulting from such interrogations necessarily involve claims of police
overreaching.201 Therefore, the logic of the Court’s due process jurisprudence should permit an
inquiry into reliability, including as part of the decision whether to suppress a confession on
grounds of involuntariness.202 But the involuntariness test still contains the danger of admitting
unreliable confessions—ones that may convict the innocent—that are nevertheless not the result
of an “overborne will.”203 Moreover, the Court’s due process jurisprudence is rarely muscular,
generally setting a very low floor of reliability.204 Accordingly, it is wise to craft other
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mechanisms for making suppression on the grounds of unreliability alone a basis for
suppression. One such mechanism is the inherent supervisory power of the courts.205 Explained
the DiGiambattista court,
The issue is not what we “require” of law enforcement, but how and on what
conditions evidence will be admitted in our courts. We retain as part of our
superintendence power the authority to regulate the presentation of evidence in
court proceedings. The question before us is whether and how we should exercise
that power with respect to the introduction of evidence concerning
interrogations.206
The Massachusetts court’s primary reason for taking this action was this: where there are
“grounds for [doubting the] reliability of certain types of evidence that the jury might
misconstrue as particularly reliable,” curative action is required.207
Another basis for more muscular protections can be state due process clauses. This
approach indeed was followed by Alaska’s highest court in Stephan v. Harris.208 There, the
Court created an exclusionary remedy under its state constitution’s due process clause for the
failure electronically to record custodial interrogations in their entirety. Said the Court, “[s]uch
recording is a requirement of state due process when the interrogation occurs in a place of
detention and recording is feasible.”209 “We reach this conclusion,” the Court explained,
“because we are convinced that recording, in such circumstances, is now a reasonable and
necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused’s right to counsel, his
right against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial.”210 Due process, the court
added, is not a “static” concept but “must change to keep pace with new technological
205
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developments.”211 The technological feasibility of electronic recording of the entire custodial
interrogation process was just such a development. Finally, the court concluded:
In the absence of an adequate record, the accused may suffer an infringement
upon his right to remain silent and to have counsel present during the
interrogation. Also, his right to a fair trial may be violated, if an illegally
obtained, and possibly false, confession is subsequently admitted. An electronic
recording, thus, protects the defendant’s constitutional rights, by providing an
objective means for him to corroborate his testimony concerning the
circumstances of the confession.212
Commentators have also argued that Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 403 and its state
law equivalents already authorize suppression of evidence, including interrogations, that is
unreliable.213 The argument is straightforward. Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to
exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a variety of
countervailing concerns, including the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury.214
Given the psychological data showing the powerful tendency of even false confessions to induce
juries to convict,215 argue these commentators, a confession obtained under circumstances having
strong indicia of unreliability will mislead the jury.216 Accordingly, the trial court has the
discretion to exclude such evidence.
These same commentators also point out that some courts have embraced a reliability
rule on a variety of grounds but under the rubric of “trustworthiness.”217 Law professor and
cognitive psychologist Richard Leo made the point thus:
Several state courts and the federal district courts have chosen to
adopt a … rule of corroboration, most often termed the
“trustworthiness standard”….In marked contrast to the corpus
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delecti rule [requiring merely proof independent of the confession
that some crime indeed occurred], the trustworthiness standard
requires corroboration of the confession itself …. Under the
trustworthiness standard, before the state may introduce a
confession it “must introduce substantial independent evidence
which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the
[confession]…. In effect, the trial court judge acts as a gatekeeper
and must determine, as a matter of law, that a confession is
trustworthy before it can be admitted. In making the
trustworthiness determination, the judge is to consider “the totality
of the circumstances”…. Only after a confession is deemed
trustworthy by a preponderance of the evidence may it be admitted
into evidence.218
Leo outlines a variety of factors courts should consider, based upon the empirical
evidence, in making this trustworthiness or reliability determination, while also offering his own
variant on the reliability test.219 What matters here are not the details of any particular approach
but rather the recognition that the unreliability of a confession – one bearing hallmarks raising a
risk of the confession’s falsity, or lacking any evidence suggesting the alleviation of such a risk -- should be an independent ground for suppression from that of involuntariness. Several states,
and a growing number of proposals, would indeed more broadly embrace the reliability standard
as one governing a wide array of evidence raising the risk of wrongful convictions, including, for
example, “snitch” testimony and that of questionable experts.220 In the interrogation context,
Leo and others have recognized, furthermore, that electronic recording is essential to sound factfinding concerning a confession’s reliability.221 The ULC Act thus recognizes that violation of
the Act’s recording mandates should be one factor in a motion to suppress a confession as
unreliable but rejects the arguably draconian solution of per se exclusion under such
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circumstances.222
State constitutional due process clauses, as interpreted by their courts, and those courts’
interpretations of the scope of their inherent supervisory power over the admission of evidence,
will vary widely.223 Reliance on state equivalents to FRE 403 as grounds for exclusion based
upon unreliability is uncertain, given the dearth of court decisions on the point.224 Some courts
articulate fuzzy grounds for their approach to reliability questions, and some approaches are too
inflexible and harsh.225 Legislative action, by contrast, brings a democratic imprimatur and the
significant investigative resources of the legislature to bear on designing appropriate remedies.226
A Uniform Act’s attention to remedies thus promises sounder and more uniform approaches to
the remedies question. At the same time, the Act’s approach does not even arguably intrude in
any significant way upon judicial prerogatives because the Act merely makes violation of its
provisions one factor for courts to consider in making the admissibility decision.
Finally, some commentators have argued that even the prospect of exclusion is
unnecessary to deter police resistance to recording requirements because the virtues of the
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procedure will quickly become evident to police once they start recording.227 Whether this is so
is a subject of some controversy, but even if it is true, deterring police overreaching is not the
sole goal of the recording requirement.228 One of its primary goals is to prevent conviction of the
innocent and thus to promote conviction of the guilty.229 Admitting an unreliable confession
creates precisely the risk of wrongful conviction that the Act seeks to prevent. The case law
summarized above and ample psychological research demonstrate the grave risk of unreliability
of unrecorded confessions and the equally grave risk that jurors are not well-equipped to spot
such unreliability.230
The only fully effective remedy for an innocent person who has given an unreliable
confession is to exclude it as evidence entirely. But the failure to record does not alone, of
course, establish such unreliability but rather turns on a case-specific judgment by the trial court.
Accordingly, the Act leaves that judgment to the trial court while making plain that it is a
judgment that the court must make and that the failure to record is a relevant factor in making
this judgment. Like Illinois, therefore, the Act adopts exclusion of unreliable confessions as an
option, albeit applying a much softer version of the exclusionary rule than did Illinois.231
B. Jury Instructions and Their Relative Efficacy
1. The Virtues of Instructions Where Videotaping Inexcusably Fails to Occur
Thomas Sullivan, one of the leading national advocates for electronic recording of
custodial interrogations, and his co-author, Andrew Vail, have strongly endorsed cautionary jury

227

See Thomas A. Sullivan and Andrew Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement Officials' Failure to Record
Custodial Interviews as Required By Law , 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (2009 [hereinafter Failure to
Record]).
228
See supra text accompanying notes 21-64.
229
See supra text accompanying notes 21-64.
230
See Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action,
74 DENV. L. REV. 979, 1120-22 (1997); Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10
CHAPMAN L. REV. 623 (2007).
231
See supra text accompanying notes 167-223.

44

instructions as a remedy for violation of recording mandates.232 Sullivan and Vail argue that fear
of such instructions will provide a significant deterrent to law enforcement violations of the
provisions of mandatory recording acts.233 They further argue that jury instructions will help to
improve the reliability of jury fact finding when the jury is faced with mere oral testimony rather
than having a verbatim recording of the entire custodial interrogation process.234 New Jersey
has followed just such an approach, declaring in its recording rule that, “in the absence of
electronic recordation required … [under this Rule], the court shall, upon request of the
defendant, provide the jury with a cautionary instruction.”235 Pursuant to that mandate, the New
Jersey judiciary has prepared fairly lengthy model jury charges as a remedy for violation of the
statute.236 Instructions are already an available remedy in several other jurisdictions, including
Montana, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts,237 highlighting the urgency of getting the
instructions right.
Sullivan and Vail’s proposed instruction would caution jurors that the officers in the case
before them inexcusably failed to comply with a recording requirement—one designed to give
jurors a complete record of what occurred; that the jurors consequently have been denied “the
most reliable evidence as to what was said and done by the participants” so that the jurors
“cannot hear the exact words used by the participants or the tone or inflection of their voices.”238
The proposed instruction would conclude as follows: “Accordingly, as you go about
determining what occurred during the interview, you should give special attention to whether
232
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you are satisfied that what was said and done has been accurately reported by the participants,
including testimony as to statements attributed by law enforcement witnesses to the
defendant.”239
Here is a variant, with changes I have made to meet the needs of the ULC Act, of their
complete instruction, which might serve as the basis for a model instruction:
State law required that the interview of the defendant by law
enforcement officers which took place on [insert date] at [insert place]
be electronically recorded, from beginning to end. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that you jurors will have before you a
complete, unaltered, and precise record of the circumstances under
which the interview was conducted, what was said, and what was done
by each person present.
In this case, the law enforcement officers did not comply with
that law. They did not make an electronic recording of the interview of
the defendant. [They made an electronic recording that did not include
the entire process of interviewing the defendant, from start to finish.]
The prosecution has not presented to the court a legally sufficient
justification for not complying with that law. Instead of an electronic
recording, you have been presented with testimony about what took
place during the custodial interrogation, based upon the recollections of
the law enforcement officers [and the defendant]. [Instead of a
complete record of the entire process of interviewing the defendant,
they have left you with only a partial record of the events.]
Therefore, I must give you the following special instructions
about your consideration of the evidence concerning that interview.
Because the interview was not electronically recorded as
required by our law, you have not been provided the most reliable
evidence about what was said and what was done by the participants.
You cannot hear the exact words used by the participants, or the tone or
inflection of their voices. [Because the interview process was not
electronically recorded in its entirety as required by law, you have not
been provided with the most reliable and complete evidence of what
was said and done by the participants].
Accordingly, as you go about determining what occurred during
the interview, you should give special attention to whether you are
satisfied that testimony of the participants accurately [and completely]
reported what was said and what was done, including testimony about
239
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statements attributed by law enforcement witnesses to the defendant. It
is for you, the jury, to decide whether the statement was made and to
determine what weight, if any, to give to the statement.240
These proposed model instructions combine elements of Sullivan’s proposed federal
instructions and of his later-proposed and similar state-level instructions,241 with modifications
made to adjust the instructions to a uniform act, like that of the ULC, recommended for state
level adoption.
Sullivan and Vail at least implicitly argue that many jurisdictions might give cursory
cautionary instructions without a fairly detailed model.242 Specifically, many courts might give
standard instructions about treating a confession with caution without adequately specifying the
reasons why jurors should do so in a way that will enable the jurors truly to understand the
dangers to reliability created by the failure to record.243 There is also an argument to be made
that more detailed instructions explaining precisely why caution is needed may more effectively
improve the jury’s ability fairly to assess the evidence given the powerful impact that
confessions have on juries.244 Given such an impact, there may be a risk that brief jury
instructions will be ignored or have little effect, particularly given the often weak or perverse
effects of jury instructions in many contexts (see the more detailed discussion of this last point
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below).245 That reason is likely why Sullivan and Vail counsel providing a fairly lengthy
standard instruction in the recording statute itself. Sullivan has been more explicit on this point
in drafting a model federal statute that includes standard jury instructions on the ill consequences
of the unexcused failure to record.246 On the other hand, the length of this sample instruction is
unusual in comparison to many sorts of common instructions, and some observers may fear that
a lengthy instruction will lead jurors to give undue weight to the failure to record by overemphasizing it.247 Alternatively, critics may worry that a lengthy instruction may backfire, either
confusing jurors or further impressing in their mind the fact that a confession was made rather
than that it was inexcusably unrecorded (if there were a recognized excuse, no jury instruction
would be given).248
The Act, in subsection 13(b), leaves trial judges ample discretion in crafting instructions
meeting the needs of each individual case.249 Consequently, the Act mandates only that remedial
instructions be given, leaving the details and length of those instructions to the trial court.250
Nevertheless, the sample instructions provided here may help to inform trial judges’ decisions on
this question.
2. The Limitations of Sole Reliance on Instructions as a Remedy
Nevertheless, it is important to explain why such instructions will not suffice as a sole
remedy. Notably, there is no empirical data on whether the availability of jury instructions will
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be an adequate deterrent to violations of recording mandates.251 Opinions differ on the point, 252
raising cause for concern were such instructions to be the sole available judicial remedy.
Furthermore, jury instructions will also be unavailable in bench trials.
More importantly, however, there is ample reason to question whether jury instructions
alone will improve jurors’ accuracy in assessing the weight to give confessions obtained in
violation of recording requirements sufficiently to compensate for the absence of a complete
recording. The ULC Drafting Committee knew of no completed studies specifically examining
the effect of jury instructions concerning the failure to electronically record the entire
interrogation process. (Such studies are, however, under way253). Nevertheless, ample studies
show that juries routinely give confessions enormous weight, even under circumstances where
there is substantial reason to be concerned about the confessions’ accuracy.254
More specifically, research has shown that jurors are not good at separating true from
false confessions—in fact do no better than chance—but do improve their ability to judge
confession accuracy when the entire interrogation process is videotaped and proper camera
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angles are used, that is, angles not focusing solely on the suspect.255 Jury instructions alone are
thus unlikely to improve jurors’ accuracy where they are denied recordings of the entire
interrogation process. Moreover, where there is no excuse for the police failure to record, there
seems little justification for ignoring this risk to the innocent.
Ample social science concerning wrongful convictions in other areas (albeit analogous
ones) than custodial interrogations also supports the conclusion that jury instructions will do too
little to improve jurors’ ability accurately to assess credibility and correctly to determine whether
a confession was true or voluntary.256 The effect of instructions on jurors varies with the subject
matter of the instruction, and some can be modestly effective.257 Yet, overall, instructions are
frequently either ineffective in changing jurors’ reasoning or have unintended effects.258
Research examining jury instructions in the most thoroughly-examined cause of wrongful
convictions, namely, unreliable eyewitness identification procedures, has particularly shown
cautionary instructions to be of little, if any, help to jurors in making good judgments about
whether the police had the right man.259
This risk is indeed no minor matter, for innocence concerns were among the primary
forces motivating the movement for electronic recording in the first place,260 and errors can
result in an innocent person being sentenced to the death penalty or to life in prison—errors hard
255
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to correct where confessions rather than DNA are the primary evidence offered.261 These
worries are important, therefore, even if it is correct that violations of recording mandates will be
relatively rare. In other words, deterrence is not the only function to be served by an
exclusionary rule in this context. Indeed, critics of the exclusionary rule, including those on the
Court, have focused their ire on the rule’s application to Fourth Amendment violations while
generally embracing the rule’s wisdom where the reliability of fact finding is at stake.262
The point of stressing the limitations of cautionary jury instructions as a remedy is not to
deny that they may be likely to have some, perhaps substantial, deterrent value or that they may
modestly improve jury reasoning. Logic suggests that cautionary instructions should help at
least somewhat on both these scores. There is indeed a significant likelihood that they will do
both. Furthermore, cautionary instructions are a modest and traditional judicial remedy.
Moreover, a court may conclude that, though suppression is not justified, some remedy is needed
to reduce the risk of error – of convicting an innocent man – given the absence of the best
evidence of the confession’s voluntariness and reliability, namely, the absence of electronic
recording. The availability of jury instructions should also allay (unjustified) concerns that
suppression may prove to be too “draconian” because suppression will not be the only remedial
option available to the trial judge.
But the limitations of cautionary instructions counsel against relying on them too heavily
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as the sole judicial remedy. For example, analogous data suggests that jury instructions’ impact
can be weak or perverse, at least if not given in conjunction with other remedies, such as expert
testimony alerting jurors to the reliability problems with certain evidence and to jurors’ own
reasoning problems that may interfere with their ability to give evidence its appropriate
weight.263 The case for the admissibility of expert testimony in the area of custodial
interrogations is even stronger, however, than the case for using social science experts in these
analogous areas.264 Furthermore, in some cases the reliability of the confession may be so in
doubt, and the jury’s ability adequately to grasp that point so insufficient, that suppression of the
confession in its entirety is required to protect against the risk of wrongly convicting the
innocent.265 This circumstance might be sufficiently rare that suppression should neither be
routine nor presumptive. Nevertheless, its consequences when it does occur are sufficiently
grave that the ULC Drafting Committee has incorporated into the Act a provision permitting trial
judges to take into account as one factor in deciding suppression motions the risks that
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confessions obtained in violation of the Act will be more likely to be involuntary or unreliable.266
C. Expert Testimony
One remedy not yet tried for violation of recording requirements is to admit expert testimony on
the factors contributing to involuntary or false confessions, the reasons why videotaping is
desirable, and the risks of not doing so. The value of this remedy has apparently also not been
studied empirically. Of course, there is growing recognition of the need for expert testimony
whenever the risk of wrongful convictions looms.267 Indeed, that is why the American Bar
Association has included similar provisions meant to encourage expert testimony in the area of
eyewitness identifications in the ABA’s Innocence Standards.268 Similarly there is cause for
optimism in using expert testimony as a remedy based upon empirical research in the area of
eyewitness identifications. That research reveals that expert testimony on the factors affecting
eyewitness accuracy substantially improved jurors’ sensitivity to the relevance and weight of
those factors—even when the science contradicted jurors’ preconceptions—and this effect was
apparently even greater among jury-eligible adults than among undergraduate jurors.269
Moreover, critics’ fears that such testimony would unduly increase acquittals of the innocent
have proven unwarranted. One recent review of the literature explained this last point thus:

Some judges have objected to psychologist experts on the
ground that they might have too much influence on the jurors,
causing them to undervalue, as opposed to overvalue, the
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eyewitness. However, a series of experiments conducted by
different researchers have shown that this is not likely to
happen. The studies have found that testimony by an expert
increased the amount of time that mock jurors spent discussing
the reliability of the witness and made jurors more sensitive to
the effects of different viewing conditions and other factors
relevant to the ability to identify a defendant. There was no
indication in the experiments that the jurors accepted the expert
testimony uncritically or that they completely discounted the
eyewitness testimony. The findings are consistent with research
we’ve noted elsewhere regarding the ability of jurors to keep
expert evidence in perspective and to evaluate it in conjunction
with other evidence.270

The consistency of the eyewitness research with other research on experts suggests that similar
results might obtain with experts on interrogations. Expert testimony might be wise
independently of any recording requirement. Because jury instructions alone likely do too little
to help a jury evaluate a confession’s voluntariness or accuracy where there is no recording of
the interrogation process, expert testimony suggests itself as an important supplementary
remedy.271 While a number of commentators and courts thus recognize the value of expert
testimony in the area of false confessions, none suggest that expert testimony be particularly
favored on this subject where the police inexcusably fail to record the entire custodial
interrogation process.272 In such circumstances, the mere failure to record raises suspicions about
why police would, without any recognizable excuse, violate recording mandates. Moreover,
juries are deprived of the best evidence of what occurred in the interrogation room and the best
270
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medium for determining the accuracy and voluntariness of the confession. Juries would just hear
the confession itself or a summary of it. Given the powerful impact of such a confession on the
jury – virtually guaranteeing conviction273 – under circumstances where it is, at best, hard to
judge the confession’s reliability, at worst there is ample reason to doubt it, there seems a
particularly great reason to inform the jury of the circumstances that could have led to a false
confession. Yet, as has been discussed above, jury instructions are unlikely alone to do that job
adequately.274 That should especially be true if the defense can produce any evidence, even via
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, that there are risk factors present in the current case.
Experts can only testify probabilistically, however, that is, that risks of error exist but cannot
opine that the individual case in fact involved a false or involuntary confession.275
The ULC drafting committee in fact originally saw the wisdom of such an approach.
Consequently, a draft section of the Act indeed included a rule urging the admissibility of expert
testimony as a remedy for recording violations where such testimony had not otherwise been
admitted.276 The testimony would still need at least to be consistent with supporting scientific
data, that is, with state expert evidence rules analogous to those in FRE 702 through 706.277
Moreover, the “appropriateness” decision need not even be considered unless “the defendant first
offers evidence sufficient to permit a finding by a preponderance of the evidence of facts
relevant to the weight of the statement the full significance of which may not be readily apparent
to a layperson.”278 Furthermore, the Act provided guidance to the trial court in making its
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decision about whether a case is an “appropriate” one for admitting expert testimony by listing a
set of common but non-exclusive circumstances that the empirical research suggests may affect a
confession’s reliability, a point that might not be readily apparent to layperson jurors.279 Such a
listing of illustrative but not exclusive situations or factors to consider in applying an evidentiary
standard is common, most familiarly in FRE 404(b).280 The factors listed to guide the
appropriateness decision in the proposed section of the Act included these:
the vulnerability to suggestion of the individual who made the
statement; the individual’s youth, low intelligence, poor memory, or
mental retardation; use by a law enforcement officer of sleep
deprivation, fatigue, or drug or alcohol withdrawal as an interrogation
technique; the failure of the statement to lead to the discovery of
evidence previously unknown to a law enforcement agency or to include
unusual elements of a crime that have not been made public previously
or details of the crime not easily guessed and not made public
previously; inconsistency between the statement and the facts of the
crime; whether an officer conducting the interrogation educated the
individual about the facts of the crime rather than eliciting them or
suggested to the individual that the individual had no choice except to
confess; promises of leniency; and the absence of corroboration of the
statement by objective evidence.281
This approach thus does not mandate admissibility of expert testimony as a remedy in every case
and does put the initial burden of demonstrating the potential value of such testimony on the
defendant. Even once that demonstration is made, however, the trial court must determine that
the case is an appropriate one for expert testimony. The admissibility of such testimony is thus
an individualized determination but with substantial guidance given trial courts concerning how
to make that determination. Of course, expert testimony on these subjects might be admissible
even absent a recording act violation, as the proposed draft section of Act also made clear.282 But
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such testimony is especially urgent given such a violation because of the jury’s reduced
evidentiary basis for making a sound decision about the weight to give the confession. The
expert testimony provision is also needed because some courts have expressed undue reluctance
to admit such testimony where needed.283 To promote fairness and accuracy, the draft version of
the Act also expressly provided that the prosecution may offer its own expert evidence in
rebuttal.284
Apart from promoting more reliable fact-finding, the expert testimony provision has the virtue of
likely adding deterrent value precisely because police and prosecutors will fear that the expert
testimony will work, that is, that it will make jurors more skeptical than they otherwise would be
about the weight of the unrecorded confession. The systemic goal, of course, is that jurors be no
more or less skeptical than the evidence warrants, but adversaries fear contrary outcomes and are
thus motivated to avoid the risk of such outcomes in the first place.
Unfortunately, in my view, the drafting committee ultimately abandoned this experts provision
after a first reading of the Act to the entire ULC. Members of the judiciary particularly opposed
the provision as encroaching on their necessary exercise of judicial discretion in evidentiary
matters. Providing guidance to courts and urging them to be more receptive to a category of
expert testimony than they have been in the past – testimony needed and supported by sound
science yet inexplicably resisted285 -- hardly seems like an undue limitation on judicial discretion
to me. Nevertheless, judicial opposition was intense. Dropping the provision was thus the right
thing to do to create an enactable statute. But, as a policy matter, I believe it was a mistake.
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III. Rulemaking
A. Monitoring and Guiding Police Performance
1. The Need for Rules Designed to Implement The Act
Building into a statute some means of monitoring police performance is highly desirable.
Ample empirical literature demonstrates that transparency and accountability improve police
performance.286 At its best, these mechanisms function both internally—enabling police
administrators to monitor their line officers’ efforts—and externally, enabling outside political
bodies and the citizenry more generally to provide further layers of review.287 Furthermore,
systematic data collection improves law enforcement’s ability to see the big picture, enhancing
the quality of its services over time and highlighting areas in which further internal regulation or
legislative control may be necessary.288 Regulations also provide clear guidance to line officers
charged with implementing the provisions of this Act, anticipating potentially problematic
situations, reducing transition costs, and improving police efficacy and efficiency.289 It is for
similar reasons that subsection 14(a) requires adoption and enforcement of rules designed to
implement this Act.290
Washington, D.C.’s statute provides that police “may” adopt an implementing general
order.291 The police have done just that, by adopting a general order requiring commanders or
superintendents of detectives’ divisions to approve requests for deviations from standard
286
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recording procedures; ensure that adequate manpower and material resources for recording are
made available; ensure that prosecution requests for original and backup recordings are timely
met; and compile statistics that include the number of custodial interrogations conducted, the
number required to be recorded, the subset of these not recorded, the reasons for not doing so,
and the sanctions imposed for failing to record when required.292 Commanders and
superintendents of detectives’ divisions must also forward the compiled statistics to the Assistant
Chief of the Office of Professional Responsibility by a specified date each month; ensure
Detective Unit maintenance of an electronic recordings logbook containing detailed information
and documenting a chain of custody; and ensure that all officers are aware of and comply with
the general order.293 That order further requires the Assistant Chief of the Office of Professional
Responsibility to submit annually to the Chief of Police a report of relevant statistics that
includes, but is not limited to, the data categories compiled by commanders.294 A model statute
need not be as detailed as an implementing police general order, but the D.C. order reflects some
basic requirements that a sound statute should contain, including:
1.

mandates for detailed data collection within, and review by superiors within, each
police department;

2.

clear, specific assignments of supervisory responsibilities to specific individuals
and a clear chain of command to promote internal accountability;

3.

a mandated system of explanation for procedural deviations and administrative
sanctions for those that are not justified;

4.

a mandated supervisory system expressly imposing on specific individuals a duty
of ensuring adequate manpower, education, and material resources to do the job;
and

5.

a mandated system for monitoring the chain of custody and responding to
prosecutor evidence and informational requests to ensure responsiveness to the
needs of the judicial branch, and to translate police action into reliable evidence
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ready for efficient use by the courts and by lawyers in both trial and pre-trial
proceedings.295
More generally, D.C.’s approach suggests a statutory mandate for police to draft detailed internal
regulations for implementing general statutory requirements.296 Subsection 14(a) of the ULC
Act accordingly outlines the minimum important subjects to be included in police regulations but
leaves those details to other entities.297 The Act offers states three bracketed options concerning
who should draft those details: “[e]ach law enforcement agency in [the] state”; an “appropriate
state authority” to be identified by name in the state’s version of this Act; or the “state agency
charged with monitoring law enforcement’s compliance with this Act.”298 The first option leaves
drafting to local law enforcement, the second to an existing state agency without otherwise
substantially changing its responsibilities, the third to an existing or new state agency where the
state chooses to identify a specific state-level entity charged with monitoring state and local law
enforcement’s compliance with the Act. There are scores of existing model regulations from
police departments already mandated to, or voluntarily choosing to, record upon which drafting
entities may draw for models.299
Although the District of Columbia’s statute merely authorized police to adopt
implementing regulations, it is worth noting that Maine, for example, by statute requires all law
enforcement agencies indeed to adopt written policies concerning electronic recording
procedures and for the preservation of investigative notes and records for all serious crimes.300
Furthermore, the chief administrative officer of each agency must certify to the Board of
295
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Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy of the State Department of Public Safety that
attempts were made to obtain public comment during the formulation of these policies.301 The
statute also requires this same Board, by a specified date, to establish minimum standards for
each law enforcement policy.302 The chief administrative officer for each law enforcement
agency must likewise certify to the Board by a specified date that the agency has adopted written
policies consistent with the Board’s standards and, by a second specified date, certifying that the
agency has provided orientation and training for its members concerning these policies.303 The
Board must also review the minimum standards annually to determine whether changes are
needed as identified by critiquing actual events or reviewing new enforcement practices
demonstrated to reduce crime, increase officer safety, or increase public safety.304 The chief
administrative officer of a municipal, county, or state law enforcement agency must further
certify to the Board by a specified date that the agency has adopted a written policy regarding
procedures for dealing with freedom of access requests and that he has designated a person
trained to respond to such requests—a system that can help to balance privacy concerns of
interviewees facing potential trials with the need for public access and evaluation.305
Maine’s Board, pursuant to this statute, indeed drafted a requirement of a written policy,
including at least certain minimum subject matters.306 More specifically, the Board required
written policies to address at least thirteen specific items, including:
a.

recognizing the importance of electronic recording;

b.

defining it in a particular way;
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c.

defining custodial interrogation in a particular way;

d.

doing the same in defining “place of detention” and “serious crimes”;

e.

reciting procedures for preserving notes, records, and recordings until all appeals
are exhausted or the statute of limitations has run;

f.

recognizing a specified list of exceptions to the recording requirement;

g.

outlining procedures for using interpreters where there is a need;

h.

mandating officer familiarity with the procedures, the mechanics of equipment
operation, and any relevant case law;

i.

mandating the availability and maintenance of recording devices and equipment;

j.

outlining a procedure for the control and disposition of recordings; and

k.

outlining procedures for complying with discovery requests for recordings, notes,
or records.307

The Maine Chiefs of Police Association further drafted a generic advisory model policy
to aid local agencies in drafting their own individual policies to comply with the statute’s and the
Board’s mandates.308 That model policy included a statement disclaiming its creating a higher
legal standard of safety or care concerning third party claims and insisting that the policy
provides the basis only for administrative sanctions by the individual agency or the Board.309
Again, the ULC Act leaves details to each state, but the Maine approach is offered as an
example of a state approach far more detailed than that specified in the ULC Act but that may be
useful in generating ideas about what details and mechanisms for creating and implementing
them a particular state might choose to follow.
2. Delegation Concerns: A Brief Note
307
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Many state courts will invalidate statutes that delegate rule-making power without
“adequate” guidance to regulatory agencies.310 But it is unlikely that this provision will prove
troublesome in this regard. Illinois’ requirements offer a helpful example. In Illinois, a
legislative delegation of regulatory authority will be valid if the legislature meets three
conditions: first, it identifies the persons and activities subject to regulation; second, it identifies
the harm sought to be prevented; and third, it identifies the general means intended to be
available to the administrator to prevent the identified harm.311 The statute must also create
“intelligible standards” to guide the agency in the execution of its delegated power, but these
criteria need not be so narrow as to govern every detail necessary in the execution of the
delegated power.312
The ULC Act, read as a whole, clearly identifies law enforcement agencies and officers
as the “persons” regulated by the Act, while further identifying the “activity subject to
regulation” as custodial interrogation as defined in Miranda, a definition with which law
enforcement have been familiar for over four decades.313 The statute further clearly declares that
this activity is regulated in one specific way: it must be electronically recorded, a term defined in
the text of the Act.314 Similarly, the Act clearly aims at preventing three sorts of harms: the
creation of involuntary confessions or of false or unreliable ones and the maximization of the
factfinder’s ability to identify involuntary, false, or unreliable confessions.315 Moreover, the
means for law enforcement agencies to carry out their responsibilities are identified in numerous
provisions: those describing when recording is necessary and when it is not (the various
310
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exceptions), those identifying what paperwork must be prepared and when, those addressing
remedies that include internal discipline being but a few of the provisions offering detailed
guidance.316 Finally, for similar reasons, the Act provides easily intelligible standards to guide
the law enforcement agency, for it will know with some specificity when, where, and how it
must tell officers to record.317 It will do so, however, with specificity sufficient to offer law
enforcement agencies guidance but not so detailed as to straightjacket their choice of specifics.318
The delegation doctrine should, therefore, not be cause for concern.
B. Numbers of Cameras and Angle
A special comment must be made about the subsection (c) of the Act’s Section _c_. This
subsection requires rules to be made governing the manner of recording, including the proper
camera angle. Subsection (c) is bracketed because it applies only in jurisdictions that require
both audio and video recording.319 Requiring rules specifying the number of cameras to use and
their angle may seem like a small, unimportant detail. It is not. Indeed, ample research
demonstrates that jurors are best at differentiating true from false confessions when the camera
focuses solely on the interrogator, second best when it focuses equally on the interrogator and the
suspect.320 Yet a suspect-focus camera angle alone “appears to actually diminish the capability
of decision makers to arrive at objectively correct assessments.”321 This last point is particularly
important because it is particularly counter-intuitive: audio recording may be superior to audio
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and video combined if the video focuses solely on the suspect.322 The combination of audio and
video, it must be stressed, is the best way to improve accuracy but only if the camera focus is
equally and simultaneously on both the suspect and the interrogator or even on the interrogator
alone.323
Most statutes and regulations ignore these details. But North Carolina recognizes their
importance, declaring that, if a visual record is made, “the camera recording the interrogation
must be placed so that the camera films both the interrogator and the suspect.”324 Thomas
Sullivan, in his latest proposed statute, also addresses this matter, declaring that, “If a visual
recording is made, the camera or cameras shall be simultaneously focused on both the law
enforcement interviewer and the suspect.”325 The Innocence Project of Cardozo University Law
School, in its proposed model statute, makes a similar recommendation.326
C. Internal Discipline
Violations of recording mandates that do not produce confessions or that produce
322
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confessions that seem obviously to violate constitutional or other admissibility requirements and
thus that are not offered as evidence at a criminal trial cannot be remedied by the criminal justice
system. Yet, as is discussed below, no civil liability may be available either under the Act if the
law enforcement agency has adopted and enforced reasonable regulations concerning
recording,327 and often potential litigants will not file suit because of minimal recoverable
damages.328 In such cases, the only effective deterrent to an individual officer’s future mistakes
will be administrative discipline. Moreover, while court remedies may be uncertain, vigorously
enforced administrative sanctions are relatively certain and thus likely to deter future error.329
Furthermore, the mere knowledge that such sanctions may be available can lead officers to act
with great care and deliberation concerning recording procedures.330 For these reasons, section
14(d) mandates that law enforcement agencies adopt rules imposing graded system of sanctions
on individual officers, sanctions reasonably designed to promote compliance with this Act.331
The subsection is bracketed, however, because in collective bargaining states, the subject matter
of subsection (d) would be controlled by collective bargaining agreements.332
D. Limitation of Actions
Section 16 of the Act addresses civil liability. Subsection 16(c) unequivocally states that
this Act does not by its terms create a cause of action against an individual law enforcement
officer.333 Subsection (b) adds further clarity by declaring that the only sanction that may be
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imposed upon an individual officer who violates this Act is administrative discipline, though it
does not mandate such discipline.334 However, the Act recognizes the possibility, without
mandating it, that courts or legislatures in individual states might find under legal principles
other than those stated in this act a civil cause of action against a law enforcement agency that
violates the provisions of this Act.335 Subsection (a) gives law enforcement agencies a safe
harbor against such liability for agencies that adopt and enforce rules reasonably designed to
ensure compliance with this Act.336 Subsection 16(a) is thus closely linked with Section 15: a
law enforcement agency adopting and enforcing the rules provided for in section 15 will be
protected from civil liability should individual officers nevertheless violate the Act despite the
reasonable efforts of the law enforcement agency.337
The major justification for this provision is that it will provide an incentive to law
enforcement agencies to vigorously implement the mandates of this Act, including providing
adequate resources to get the job done.338 If a law enforcement agency creates and enforces
procedures designed to, and likely to, result in vigorous enforcement of this Act, there seems
little justification in exposing it to civil liability for the occasional error by an individual officer.
At the same time, however, because the primary responsibility and power to ensure compliance
with this Act rests with the law enforcement agencies, little is gained in terms of fairness or
deterrence by exposing individual officers to civil liability.339

334

See id. §16(b).
See id. §16(a).( A law enforcement agency that is a governmental entity in this state which has
implemented procedures reasonably designed to enforce the rules adopted pursuant to Section 15 and ensure
compliance with this [act] is not subject to civil liability for damages arising from a violation of this [act].).
336
See id. §16(a).
337
See id. .§§ 15, 16(a).
338
Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 502-04, 566-73 (2006) (making similar point in the context of search and
seizure policy).
339
This assertion, I admit, is subject to serious dispute. See Slobogin, supra note 330, at 364-68 (arguing for the
importance of individual officer civil liability). But if these criticisms are correct, I note only this: no adequate
335

67

One helpful analogy occurs in the federal law concerning Title VII hostile environment
sexual harassment cases.340 An employer is vicariously liable for its supervisory employees’
actions in such cases but can raise as an affirmative defense that the employer both exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior and that the plaintiff
employee failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.341 The result of this defense has been for many
employers to adopt and implement anti-harassment policies.342
Critics have charged that courts are often too deferential to employers in upholding
defenses based on weak policies – policies unlikely to correct bad behavior and in fact not doing
so.343 Furthermore, there is significant evidence that effective training programs are the most
valuable mechanism for improving compliance, and these policies have sometimes promoted
such programs.344 These programs are likely to be most effective when they also contain an
individualized component addressing the training needs of particular employees.345 At the same
time, critics emphasize the need for employers to track their programs and tinker with them to
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improve their actual effectiveness, based upon performance, in reducing sexual harassment.346
Such tracking is needed to avoid prevention programs becoming more publicity stunts than
serious efforts to resolve the harassment problem.347 These are reasons enough to provide a
similar defense to law enforcement agencies under this Act. Indeed, there is substantial evidence
that properly designed rules, including training programs, detailed guidance on procedures, and
effective internal sanctioning measures are significantly effective in improving police
performance in a range of areas.348 Proper program design is key; that is why Section 14 of this
Act – seeking to learn lessons from the experience under Title VII – stresses that rules address
training and education.349 It is also why the rules mandated by that section require a process for
explaining noncompliance.350 Ample social science demonstrates that the mere knowledge that
one must explain his or her actions improves performance, including that of the police.351
Moreover, the availability of other potential remedies – not simply a defense against civil
liability – provided for in this Act should provide an even greater incentive for creating sound
regulatory policies and zealously enforcing them than is true in the case of sexual harassment.
Some commentators have indeed argued that the United States Supreme Court has, in its
constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence, been moving toward recognizing a “reasonable
care” defense to suppression motions based on constitutional violations, perhaps doing so as well
in civil actions for such violations.352 That movement is likewise based on an implicit analogy to
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the law of entity liability in the area of sexual harassment.353 Although this Act may not be
constitutionally mandated, the logic of improving deterrence while avoiding penalties where
there is minimal entity or individual culpability makes much sense and is followed here.
IV. Conclusion
The Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act is, from a policy perspective,

not perfect. It would benefit from provisions addressing the use of expert testimony where law
enforcement has, without excuse, failed to record a custodial interrogation in its entirety. It might
also benefit from a stronger suppression remedy. But these policy weaknesses are few and
highlight the Act’s real strength: it resulted from compromise and deliberative debate among a
wide range of parties. Even if it is not entirely the Act that I would have drafted were I king, it is
an Act far more likely to receive widespread support from all stakeholders. It also is an important
effort by a prestigious organization to foster reducing convictions of the innocent while
improving our ability to catch and punish the guilty. It provides states great flexibility in crafting
a statute meeting their needs. Yet it does require recording at least some custodial interrogations
in their entirety. Experience teaches that using recording in some instances will prove so fruitful
for law enforcement that they will over time themselves seek expansion of the numbers of
instances in which recording is required. Moreover, the Act contains provisions to promote
efficiency and accountability, its commentary models jury instructions and other matters, and it
contains incentives for police to record. It is, therefore, a huge step forward. Only time will tell
whether my optimism is justified.
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